This is a fair review for the most part. However, while I used to concur with the presumption of atheism, in God and Other Minds, Plantinga showed that "if there are no solid arguments to believe that that is the case, lack of belief is the only logical alternative," is simply not true. Plantinga showed that it is not irrational to hold a belief in something if the arguments for and against either side are inconclusive. There are no good arguments that other minds exist. The arguments for and against the proposition that other minds exist are at best inconclusive; there is no reason to assume that the reason other individuals interact with you is because they are self-conscious rather than that their neural machinery is turning out appropriate responses regarding their current circumstances, or to assume that you aren't being deceived by a program like the matrix. However, while there is no way to prove that other minds exist, it is nonetheless not irrational to believe that other minds do, in fact, exist. Other reason for the warrant of that belief must be given, however, but this can be given for both theism and other minds, and Plantinga unwraps the reason for warranted Christian belief in his book titled just that.
I really appreciate him posting this, because it made me realize that, if that was brought up while I was debating, I would not have an immediate response, and it would take me even longer to be able to effectively articulate why this example doesn’t work. In that sense it was quite humbling. What I said was just something I assumed people would intuitively realize to be the case.
But, luckily, I’m not in a debate, so I had a lot of time to think about it, and came up with a couple reasons why I disagree with Plantiga’s argument. Feel free to respond about why I’m wrong, why I’m right, or other arguments. I have not read Plantiga’s book, so it’s quite possible he has already responded to these.
My best response would be that I think the reader is confusing Plantiga’s argument, that we can accept things without absolutely conclusive proof for them, with my claim, that we should have good evidence for something in order to believe it. I think this because, at the end of the paragraph, he says, “Other reason(sp) for the warrant of that belief must be given, however, but this can be given for both theism and other minds”, which says that there are indeed good reasons to believe that other people have minds as well. This would agree with my claim. But I have not read Plantiga’s book, so let’s continue assuming I’m incorrect and Plantiga is saying that we can accept something without any good evidence, and that he’s using the mind as an example of this.
The mind is a very philosophical idea. Making the claim “the mind exists” is really something that we shouldn’t take for granted or assume is the case. Indeed if we want to question its existence, we first have to examine what exactly we mean by the term. A google search would yield the definition, “that which is responsible for one's thoughts and feelings; the seat of the faculty of reason”. But isn’t that just the brain? The concept of “the mind” is just that, a concept. It is a word used to describe the fact that we can internally rationalize and think in a seemingly independent fashion. That we are able to make choices about things and be an individual, not just physically, but in the mind as well. It’s not something that exists; it’s a word we use to describe the conscious processes we do in our daily lives, and that we are able to see ourselves as an individual. If we wanted to say the mind exists (for others but even for us as well) we’d have to rethink what we mean by exist.
However, even if we assume that the mind exists, I think that the argument still has some issues. Who is to say that evidence for this “mind” word we’ve been talking about is inconclusive? For example, we know that thought originates from the brain, and, if we were to examine people’s brains, we can come to the conclusion that they are all quite similar, and that certain thoughts (products of “the mind”) even trigger brain activity in the same areas of the brain from person to person. We could even compare other peoples’ minds to our own with certain types of brain scans.
Of course there is the possibility that everyone else in the world is not self conscious. But is this really the most likely situation? I think that the simple answer to that would be no, given what we know about the brain and our daily experience interacting with other people. Indeed, if we were the only self-conscious individuals, just about everything we know about everything would be incorrect, including many scientific claims that are now seen as fact. In this respect there is a lot of evidence for other minds, even if there is no way to find absolute proof that it is the case.
I did take the time to check out the user’s own blog, and to be honest it is quite interesting to read. He himself seems to be very enthusiastic about philosophy, and even when he reads something that agrees with his conclusion (I’m assuming he’s a Christian or a weak atheist who is still open to the idea of Christianity), he still looks to critique, which I find speaks very well to his character. So feel free to check it out and leave comments!
11 comments:
This level of epistemological asceticism is probably why most people hate philosophy/ers. This topic is specifically known as solipsism, or dualism. And hey its great.. 'cept the part that accepting it means making a hash of all human knowledge and enterprise. Why send money to Haiti? You've no "real" proof it or those people exist. Also some point-by-point errors:
"There are no good arguments that other minds exist. "
Yes there are. Elsewise no academic domain called Psychology could exist.
"there is no reason to assume that the reason other individuals interact with you is because they are self-conscious rather than that their neural machinery is turning out appropriate responses regarding their current circumstances"
Neural machinery that is capable of "turning out appropriate responses" is pretty much what we mean by "mind" and may be the same thing as "consciousness" as well.
"...or to assume that you aren't being deceived by a program like the matrix."
In the matrix the "machines" clearly do have minds. They have internal states, desires, wishes, feelings, etc.., so this is hardly much of an argument against minds so much as an argument minds could be made of things other than neurons.
"Other reason for the warrant of that belief must be given, however, but this can be given for both theism and other minds"
I havn't read Plantinga's book either but certainly if I accepted the given premises of metacog I would conclude both minds and theism irrational (and all other things beyond my immediate thoughts). I find it disingenuous and rather commonplace "turtles all the way down" theorizing to appeal to a philosophical mystery (minds) in order to justify a philosophical absurdity (gods). It's just fancy-pants "we don't understand X, therefore maybe Y" thinking.
If the mind existed in spite of our neural machinery as opposed to a product of it, one could probably expect the mind to function just fine in spite of removing parts of the brain that allow this, that, the other part of what we consider the mind.
But it doesn't. We don't have to go around braining people to test it due to our own fragile bodies providing a plethora of hapless victims of brain damage due to injury or disease.
At first glance the mind is a fairly awe inspiring instrument. It stands at the pinnacle of everything we can or will ever know. Upon further observation that it's an arrangement of organic matter-glop, it becomes apparent how deceiving our first impression is.
Like with vision using our imperfect eyes to create the illusion of far better perception than the physical instrument is actually capable of, memory has numerous ways of 'filling in the blanks' for the imperfect machine beneath it.
In the game of evolution, where useful but imperfect mutations can have a survival advantage, this is to be expected. From a "design" standpoint there's little reason to believe that this network of nonsensical imperfections being developed to counter previous "mistakes" makes a lick of sense.
The mind is no exception. Brains can be damaged to the point that there is no mind, yet enough to keep the involuntary controls intact. We can use chemicals to retard the function of various parts of the brain and see what effect that has on the mind, right down to black-out drunk operation.
Detaching the mind from the brain is a fun philosophical thought experiment, but your mind simply can't have it if I cut out the right pieces of your brain that produce the functionality to allow the perception of it.
Thanks Glock21 for your response. Very well put!
Thanks for the Kudos. Also thanks to all behind the group and blog. The silver lining to all the debate fracas on-line has been discovering all sorts of nifty freethinking sites based right here in the local community. I've thoroughly enjoyed perusing the thoughts and ramblings of fellow heathens.
Well said Glock. I might add the propensity to imagine minds are some airy nonphysical thing is itself a byproduct of evolutionary selective pressure: understanding the humans around you own beliefs and desires by which they will act. I'm sure you already know this concept, known as Theory of Mind. Dev'l researchers have illustrated how this feature first does not then does exist in young children. The unfortunate side effect is that we feel (not merely think) the mind is outside of matter because mind recognition is such a well developed faculty.
Hey, thanks for the reply, and the kind words :). I think I've miscommunicated, though. I wasn't trying to say was that belief without warrant is fine so long as the evidence is inconclusive. What I was trying to show is the problem with evidentialism--or classical foundationalism, either one--as the only begetter of knowledge. The problem of using evidence alone--or classical foundationalism as a whole--isn't just limited to other minds, but also to whether the past was created only 5 minutes ago with an appearance of age coupled with false memories, or to whether rationality exists (it's impossible to give a non-circular argument for the veridicality of rationality), or even that the world around me is real and not some illusion created by a boltzmann brain.
What I was getting at is that even if evidence itself is inconclusive, sources besides arguments exist that can provide warrant for a belief. This is also what Plantinga expounds on in Warranted Christian Belief; he's mostly a philosopherof epistemology, so it's a great read. So yeah, I agree with you, you're still unjustifiedin a belief if no proof can be offered for it. I was just trying to point out that arguments (presumably based upon evidence) are not always and necessarilythe proof that must be given.
Thanks again for the comment, though :).
Metacog said What I was getting at is that even if evidence itself is inconclusive, sources besides arguments exist that can provide warrant for a belief.
But there just isn't anything else. There is evidence and inference vs.. what? Nothing but mad fantasy, delusion... dead ends.
If we agree our senses are not reliable and we're in a matrix or whatever then that is the end of all inquiry and thought. It can not be dis/proven and it offers no insight or understand. Philosophy is a study of basic and fundamental problems but any study has to take axioms as true in order to exist. This approach has born fruit but the 'duude what if like our universe is like.. an atom.. man!' fantasizing yields nothing and goes nowhere. Unless one is calling for the wholesale end of inquiry, philosophy, and human enterprise.. then we have to let such perspectives go.
Clint said But there just isn't anything else. There is evidence and inference vs.. what? Nothing but mad fantasy, delusion... dead ends.
Can you provide me some evidence that evidence and inference based off that evidence is the only begetter of truth? Since you can't, why should I take your statement as true? Doesn't the shortcomings of this statement alone seem to indicate that there is plausibly a source of warrant besides brute evidence and inference? I don't feel like taking the time to go into those sources of warrant, but read almost anything in the philosophy of epistemology in the last 30 years. Plantinga'sWarrant:The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function are good books showing the shortcomings of evidentialism as well as a plausible alternative.
Can you provide me some evidence that evidence and inference based off that evidence is the only begetter of truth?
The cumulative body of scientific and technological knowledge couple with the dramatic failure of all approaches to knowledge that disregard standards of evidence and reason.
Plantinga is an avowed Christian apologist trying to resurrect the long-dead and rather embarrassing ontological argument in a reliabilist wrapper. Even if he wasn't so obviously agendized and trying so fervently to salvage his theism his "belief X = true because we aren't alway's sure how true beliefs arise" argumentation is flakey at best.
yeah meta, right now I'm with ed, but I am very curious about what these alternate methods are and why there is any reason to believe they would be more effective. Unfortunately I don't have the time to read the book right now (although now I definitely want to read Plantiga's once I get more time), but can you give a couple examples to what these alternate ways to "prove" things are? I'm not very knowledgeable on the subject and quite curious.
Well, I couldn't explain Plantinga in a single post. He is not an apologist; rather, he's a philosopher of epistemology--though he may be taken out of context by various apologists (he repeatedly says that the various arguments for theistic belief are lacking, which is hardly an apologist's statement). Because of this, it's hard to summarize his argument without brutalizing it. If you have time, and you'd like a nice read, check out
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/plantinga/warrant3.toc.html
and read chapters 3 through 6 (or more if you want, 3-6 covers what I've been talking about). You'll find that it's a fair treatment of evidentialism and classical foundationalism. Also, you'll see that he's very explicit that if Christian belief is ontologically false, then it fails the test of warrant. Plantinga's definition of warrant is that "Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth. We must add, furthermore, that when a belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys depends on the strength of the belief, the firmness with which S holds it" and he shows why, if Christian belief is ontologically correct, it meets these conditions. Notice too that this definition of warrant includes your definition of a warranted belief, Clint, but that it isn't self-defeating--as evidence alone is.
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