The Euthyphro Dilemma is a classic argument against the possibility
that God is the source of Biblical morality. This argument demonstrates that Christians are either forced to accept "divine command" morality, which I will define shortly, or have no moral basis whatsoever.
The dilemma is as follows:
The dilemma is as follows:
A. Is something good simply
because God commands it?
OR
B. Does God command something because it is good?
If B, God commands something because it is good, then God is not the source of morality; he is merely the messenger. Granted, he may be the only vessel through which we could have access to this information, but most Christians aren’t happy with this. They want God to be the foundation of morality, not simply the delivery man.
If A, something is good simply because God commands it, then “good” simply means “it’s what God said to do”. Telling someone, “You ought to do X” means nothing more than, “God told you to do X.”
Now some Christians are actually quite happy with this definition of morality (e.g. William Craig), and they’ve called it “Divine Command Theory”, where “what I ought to do” is “what God tells me to do”. And believe it or not, I, as an atheist, am perfectly content with Christians who define morality this way; it makes perfect sense. After all, if you don’t do what God says, you’re going to go to Hell, right? So if you don’t want to go to Hell, then you ought to follow God’s commands.
This is a very simple chain of reasoning that we use every day: “If I don’t want to experience X, I ought not do Y, because Y causes X.” For example, if I want to avoid injury, I ought not run into traffic, because running into traffic usually causes injury.” There's nothing wrong with applying this thought process to God and Hell, and I think it's a very honest thing for Christians to do, although it IS a tacit admission that Christianity isn't so much a "moral" system as it is a celestial North Korea.
But not all Christians are content with this definition of morality: they want the word “moral” to be special; they want it to means something greater than simply serving your own interests, and because of this, many Christians reject option A as well as option B, and instead try to offer a third option: “Morality is based on God’s nature, not his commands or something other than himself. For example, God cannot lie, so lying is immoral.”
This seems to have split the horns of the dilemma, as it makes no appeal to God’s commands or to something that is not God. But actually, this just puts the dilemma into different terms:
A. Does God control his nature?
OR
B. Is God’s nature determined by something else?
OR
B. Does God command something because it is good?
If B, God commands something because it is good, then God is not the source of morality; he is merely the messenger. Granted, he may be the only vessel through which we could have access to this information, but most Christians aren’t happy with this. They want God to be the foundation of morality, not simply the delivery man.
If A, something is good simply because God commands it, then “good” simply means “it’s what God said to do”. Telling someone, “You ought to do X” means nothing more than, “God told you to do X.”
Now some Christians are actually quite happy with this definition of morality (e.g. William Craig), and they’ve called it “Divine Command Theory”, where “what I ought to do” is “what God tells me to do”. And believe it or not, I, as an atheist, am perfectly content with Christians who define morality this way; it makes perfect sense. After all, if you don’t do what God says, you’re going to go to Hell, right? So if you don’t want to go to Hell, then you ought to follow God’s commands.
This is a very simple chain of reasoning that we use every day: “If I don’t want to experience X, I ought not do Y, because Y causes X.” For example, if I want to avoid injury, I ought not run into traffic, because running into traffic usually causes injury.” There's nothing wrong with applying this thought process to God and Hell, and I think it's a very honest thing for Christians to do, although it IS a tacit admission that Christianity isn't so much a "moral" system as it is a celestial North Korea.
But not all Christians are content with this definition of morality: they want the word “moral” to be special; they want it to means something greater than simply serving your own interests, and because of this, many Christians reject option A as well as option B, and instead try to offer a third option: “Morality is based on God’s nature, not his commands or something other than himself. For example, God cannot lie, so lying is immoral.”
This seems to have split the horns of the dilemma, as it makes no appeal to God’s commands or to something that is not God. But actually, this just puts the dilemma into different terms:
A. Does God control his nature?
OR
B. Is God’s nature determined by something else?
If A, God controls his own nature, then “good” simply means, “whatever God decided to say was good”. God is using his nature as a “middle man” to convey his statements about morality. God could have made anything good because he picked his own nature. This situation has the same net result as if “good” simply meant, “that which God commands”. It’s all down to God’s choices: those are what set the standard.
If B, God’s nature is determined by something else, then, once again, God is not the source of morality, he is merely the messenger, except this time instead of delivering a paper letter, he’s been born with a birthmark that is the text of the letter. God is still not the cause of the message.
So like I said, splitting the horns of the dilemma does not save God from it: this merely puts the dilemma into different terms.
But, ever the optimists, there’s one more answer I’ve heard from Christians for the second dilemma above: “God’s nature is necessarily the way it is. E.g. it is necessary that God cannot lie.”
And here's where we reach the dead end of the line. The problem with this answer is that the word “necessary” cannot be used on its own; saying that X is “necessary” requires something that is doing the necessitating: God’s nature is necessary… for what? I’ve never been presented with a reason why God’s nature has to be the way it is and couldn’t be any other way.
One possible answer is that “God’s nature is the way it is because otherwise he would not be God, by definition.” Of course, we can all see that this is now appealing to the Ontological Argument, which I don’t think I need to spend time debunking here.
And this is where the moral train stops: this is where God is forced to get off because he doesn't have a ticket. It was a good forgery, it took him pretty far, and some conductors even accepted it, but ultimately, it didn't convince most Christians. Maybe next time.









